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THE DISABILITY DEFENSE: HOW IT SERVES TO MITIGATE
CHARGES OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY
ATTORNEYS
The disability defense to charges of attorney misconduct has gained recent at-
tention throughout the nation. Minnesota has been at the forefront in recog-
nizing chemical dependency and mental illnesses as factors that should be
carefully considered when determining penalties for professional misconduct.
Although the disability defense has both its proponents and opponents, it nev-
ertheless serves the overall goals of public protection while simultaneously rec-
ognizing that disease-inspired misconduct should be considered as a mitigating
factor.
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INTRODUCTION
The setting is the office of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board (Board)l ten years ago. In the conference room, the Board's
1. The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (Board) is an agency of the
Minnesota Supreme Court. It is charged with policing the practice of law in Minne-
sota. The Board is comprised of a chairman, a director, seven attorney members,
and nine lay members. MINNESOTA RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 4. The director manages a staff of approximately six prosecuting attorneys.
Telephone interview with Ken Jorgensen, Oral Advisory Opinion Attorney, Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board (February 25, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Jorgen-
sen Interview]. The Board reviews approximately 1000 complaints against Minne-
sota attorneys each year. In eighty-three percent of these cases, a determination is
made that discipline is not warranted. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITrEE ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE 1, 9 (1985).
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counsel2 sits across from the respondent,S a chronic alcoholic,
charged with commingling4 and converting client trust funds to his
own use.5 After explaining the possible charges,6 the respondent is
asked if he will stipulate to the charges.7 The respondent agrees. A
few months later, the Minnesota Supreme Court disbars the respon-
dent indefinitely for professional misconduct.8
Today, the same circumstances might produce significantly differ-
ent results. Instead of stipulating to the charges, the respondent
2. The Director and one staff attorney usually comprise the Board's counsel.
Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1. Counsel for the Board presents each case to a
panel from the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board. MINNESOTA RuLEs ON
LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBI.rrY Rule 9. The panel consists of two attorneys
and one lay member. Id Rule 4(d). The panel determines whether or not discipline
is warranted. Id. Rule 9(i). If discipline is warranted, the Board instructs the direc-
tor to file a petition for discipinary action with the Minnesota Supreme Court. Idl
The court may appoint a referee for a determination of findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and for a proposed order. Id. Rule 14. The Minnesota Supreme Court may
then affirm, deny, or modify the proposed order. Id. Rule 15.
3. The respondent is the attorney who has been charged with professional mis-
conduct. An attorney so charged must respond to the Lawyers Professional Respon-
sibility Board or face additional charges of noncooperation pursuant to Rule 25; see
aso In re Cartwright, 282 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1981) (suspension warranted where
attorney repeatedly refused to cooperate with the Board concerning complaints
against him).
4. Commingling client and attorney funds is prohibited, even if fraud is not
involved. See MINNESOTA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1985), for-
merly MINNESOTA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102, 9-103, 9-104
(1984). The Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility was repealed as of Au-
gust 31, 1985. The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the Minnesota Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct effective September 1, 1985, as the new standard of professional
conduct for Minnesota attorneys.
Further references to rules of attorney conduct will first cite the new Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct, followed by parallel references to the old Minnesota
Code of Professional Responsibility. Substantive changes in the rules, if any, will be
noted.
5. Converting client funds for the attorney's use or benefit is prohibited. See
MINNESOTA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1985), formerly MINNESOTA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-102, 9-103, 9-104.
6. Opinion 9, Reported in BENCH & B. MINN. Oct., 1983, at 38, adopted June
23, 1983, consists of a formal opinion authored by the Lawyers Professional Respon-
sibility Board. It provides guidelines for setting up separate client trust funds and
law firm accounts. Opinion 9 supplemented the old Minnesota Code of Professional
Responsibility. Opinion 9 remains useful under the new rules as a reference.
7. Stipulations are used more frequently today than in the past. Jorgensen In-
terview, supra note 1. Typically, the respondent and the Board's counsel agree that
the respondent committed certain acts of misconduct. The respondent will comply
with particular disciplinary sanctions. See MINNESOTA RuLEs ON LAWYERS PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 8(c)(3). Stipulations save added litigation costs incurred
when presenting a disciplinary action to a panel of the Board, a referee, and possibly
to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
8. A result similar to the hypothetical was reached in In re Bialick, 298 Minn.
376, 215 N.W.2d 613 (1974). See infta notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
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THE DISABILITY DEFENSE
may claim that alcohol abuse and its attending emotional problems
caused his misconduct. The respondent may argue that charges
against him should be mitigated. The matter goes to the panel pro-
ceeding 9 and then to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The court con-
sequently recognizes the respondent's disability. As a result, the
respondent is given a supervised suspension with permission to ap-
ply for readmission to the Bar in three years.lO
Minnesota disciplinary case law has shifted the treatment afforded
attorneys suffering from a disability. In both In rejohnson 1l and In re
Weyhrich, 12 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an attorney's dis-
ability may be asserted to mitigate charges of misconduct in certain
circumstances.13 This Note discusses the impact of these cases on
Minnesota disciplinary law and examines the disability defense.
First, the recent developments in categorizing chemical dependency
as a disease and the associated legal considerations are addressed.
This Note continues with an analysis of the acceptance and clarifica-
tion of the disability defense. Finally, the criteria for the disability
defense are examined and criticized. This section also includes an
examination of the potential ramifications of the defense.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF CHEMICAL DEPENDENCY
A. Chemical Dependency as a Disease
For most of the twentieth century, alcohol and drug abuse was
viewed as a sin.14 The "sin model" views chemical dependency as a
sign of moral weakness because it is perceived that the abuser can
9. Suspension with conditions for reinstatement to the bar is gaining more pop-
ularity as a disciplinary alternative. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1. The respon-
dent's progress is supervised by a peer, usually another attorney practicing in the
respondent's geographic area and field of expertise. Id The respondent must show
that he has met the conditions for reinstatement by clear and convincing evidence. In
re Swanson, 343 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. 1984). Based upon these reports, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court determines whether the respondent may be readmitted to the
bar at the conclusion of the suspension period. Id.
10. A result similar to this hypothetical was reached in In re Weyhrich, 339
N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1983). See infra notes 102-16 and accompanying text.
11. 322 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1982).
12. 339 N.W.2d 274.
13. For a discussion ofJohnson and Weyhrich, see generally infra notes 59-123 and
accompanying text.
14. Note, AlcoholAbuse and the Law, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1661-62 (1981). The
"sin model" explains the prior approach to handling alcoholic attorneys. The "sin
model" focuses on the voluntariness of alcoholic abuse. The model posits that
although it is unfair to punish one for his involuntary acts, it is not manifestly unfair
to punish those who voluntarily cause harm to others. Id at 1661. Similarly, one
who negligently creates a risk of harm to others is not as culpable as one who pur-
posely creates a risk. Id. at 1678.
1985]
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overcome his problem through the exertion of will.t5 In the 1960's
and 1970's, however, researchers discovered a great deal about
chemical dependency problems.16 A shift in focus occurred. Alco-
holism began to be recognized as a disease. Thus, the "disease
model" gained prominence and became a viable alternative, thereby
challenging the logic of the former "sin model."'
7
The disease model views chemical dependency as generally
outside the abuser's control.18 The abuser is categorized neither as
immoral nor of weak character.' 9 Because chemical abuse is a dis-
ease, medical treatment is both necessary and proper. 2
0
B. Legal Developments Addressing the Problem
As the disease model rose in popularity, legislation began to show
greater sensitivity toward abusers. 21 In addition, case law began to
decriminalize public intoxication and strike down habitual abuser
statutes.2 2 The most significant legal development came in 1971
15. Id. at 1662. Under the "sin model," disciplinary authorities were often reluc-
tant to rule that an attorney's misconduct was caused by alcoholism or drug addic-
tion. Rather than suspend the attorney, the court would usually disbar him. See
Bialick, 298 Minn. at 376, 215 N.W.2d at 613. In Bialick, the Minnesota Supreme
Court ordered disbarment despite the fact that the attorney had suffered from a per-
sonality disorder for the last several years, had been addicted to narcotics, and had
claimed that these factors contributed to his irresponsibility in the practice of law. Id
at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 614.
16. Note, supra note 14, at 1661.
17. Id. at 1662.
18. ARCHER, OCCUPATIONAL ALCOHOLISM: A REVIEW OF ISSUES AND A GUIDE TO
THE LITERATURE, ALCOHOLISM AND rrs TREATMENT IN INDUSTRY, 1, 10 (C. Schram ed.
1977), (cited in Note, supra note 14, at 1662.
19. Fox, TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM DRINKER BY THE PRIVATE PRACTITIONER,
ALCOHOLISM: PROGRESS IN RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 233 (P. Borne and R. Fox eds.
1973), (cited in Note, supra note 14, at 1662.
20. See Note, supra note 14, at 1662.
21. Nearly one-third of the states adopted a decriminalized philosophy in alcohol
and narcotic statutes. See Note, supra note 14, at 1667.
22. But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962). Robinson involved an arrest and conviction for violating a California stat-
ute that made it a misdemeanor to be addicted to narcotics. The United States
Supreme Court struck down this statute on the grounds that it constituted cruel and
unusual punishment. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Court stated that the statute
made the "status" of narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender
may be prosecuted at any time before he reforms. ld at 666.
The United States Supreme Court came to a different result in PowelL In this
case, the defendant was arrested and convicted for public drunkenness. It was ap-
proximately the one-hundredth time that this had happened to him. He appealed to
the Supreme Court on grounds that he suffered from chronic alcoholism. Refusing
to overturn his conviction, the Court distinguished Robinson. The Powell court stated
that the conviction in Robinson was based on the defendant's status as a narcotics
addict. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533. Conversely, conviction in Powell was affirmed
[Vol. 12
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THE DISABILITY DEFENSE
when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment
Act (Uniform Act).23 Under the Uniform Act, an alcoholic cannot be
criminally prosecuted.24 All statutes that included drinking or
drunkenness as an element of a crime would be repealed under the
Uniform Act.25
The adoption of the Uniform Act and its ratification by a number
of states26 insures that alcohol abusers receive noncriminal treat-
ment.27 At the present time, states focus on providing medical and
rehabilitative services to abusers in civil settings such as detoxifica-
tion centers, rather than sending the abuser tojail.28 This focus con-
tinues to protect society's interests in safety by keeping the abuser off
the streets.
The decriminalization movement has been evaluated upon public
policy grounds.29 Based upon these public policy issues, the
because the defendant had appeared in public while drunk on particular occasions.
Id. at 352.
23. UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND INTOXIFICATION TREATMENT ACr §§ 1-38,9 U.L.A. 57
(1979) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM AcT]. The Uniform Act's declaration of policy
states that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prose-
cution because of their consumption of alcohol. The alcoholic should be afforded
treatment in order that he or she may lead a normal life as a productive member of
society. Id. § 1.
24. UNIFORM ACT, supra note 23, § 19(a). Under the Uniform Act, no county,
municipality, or other political subdivision may adopt or enforce a local law, ordi-
nance, resolution, or rule that includes drunkenness as an element of the offense
giving rise to criminal or civil penalty or sanction. Id Offenses involving the opera-
tion of a vehicle are excluded. Id. § 19(c).
25. See id. § 37. Section 37 is a repealer for those statutes previously in effect
which are inconsistent with the provisions of section 19 of the Uniform Act. See id
§ 37.
26. Note, supra note 14, at 1668. Presently, eleven jurisdictions have adopted the
Uniform Act, including Minnesota's neighboring states of Iowa, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin. Minnesota, however, has not adopted the Uniform Act. 9 U.L.A. at 57.
27. Note, supra note 14, at 1669-70. Section 19(a) of the Uniform Act advocates
the noncriminal treatment of intoxication. See UNIFORM AcT, supra note 23, § 19(a).
28. Note, supra note 14, at 1670. Medical services and rehabilitation now focus
on "drying out" and on emergency medical care. Id The Uniform Act provides that
entrance and treatment are usually voluntary, except in cases when the abuser is
placed in protective custody. UNIFORM AcT, supra note 23, §§ 12(d), 13. Under the
Uniform Act, custody lasts a maximum of five days, which is the duration of the de-
toxification period. Id. § 13(e). From a practical standpoint, however, the detoxifica-
tion period averages usually only two or three days. Note, supra note 14, at 1670.
After the detoxification period, the Act provides that the abuser should be en-
couraged to continue with outpatient or intermediate treatment. UNIFORM ACT, supra
note 23, § 11 (d). Unless he chooses to remain, the abuser may not be detained be-
yond the detoxification period despite the fact that treatment has not been success-
fully completed. Id. § 13. If the abuser chooses to remain, the focus is on outpatient
programs such as counseling and group meetings. See id. § 10(a).
29. Note, supra note 14, at 1670-71. The purposes of the movement include: (1)
1985]
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decriminalization approach is at least as effective as the criminaliza-
tion approach and, in some instances, it is far more effective.SO
Increased knowledge about chemical abuse, the decriminalization
movement, and the disease model have influenced the legal profes-
sion. In 1972, the American Bar Association approved the Uniform
Act.31 In Hennepin County, Minnesota, a support group has devel-
oped, entitled Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL).S2 Modeled af-
ter Alcoholics Anonymous,33 LCL was created to provide support
and counseling for lawyers afflicted by alcohol and drug abuse.3 4
Even though bar associations throughout the nation moved in a
direction consistent with a decriminalization approach, attorney mis-
conduct case law has not experienced a similar development. As late
as 1974, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that alcoholism was not
an excuse for professional misconduct.3 5 Finally, in 1982, at the sug-
gestion of the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility Board, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court began to view alcoholism in a different
light.3 6
II. THE BIRTH OF THE DISABILrrY DEFENSE
Three main decisions characterize Minnesota's shift toward ac-
cepting an attorney's disability as a faultless disease: In re Bialick,37
In reJohnson, 38 and In re Weyhrich. 3 9 While the first of these decisions,
Bialick, refused to recognize chemical abuse as a mitigating factor,40
the decision raised issues which the court later addressed in John-
son 4 l and Weyhrich.42
rehabilitating the alcoholic; (2) deterring public intoxication; (3) providing treatment
for alcoholics; (4) maintaining orderly streets; and (5) protecting alcoholics from
themselves. Id. at 1671.
30. Id. at 1671-73.
31. 9 U.L.A. 57.
32. Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers (LCL) provides support group counseling
for chemically dependent attorneys and judges practicing in Hennepin County.
Telephone interview with David Kuduk, Attorney and Chairperson of Lawyers Con-
cerned for Lawyers (Oct. 14, 1985).
33. LCL encourages individual and family counseling for attorneys afflicted with
alcoholism. Members are encouraged to attend support group meetings on a regular
basis. Id.
34. Approximately 300 attorneys support LCL. Id
35. In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 215 N.W.2d 613 (1974).
36. In reJohnson, 322 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1982).
37. 298 Minn. 376, 215 N.W.2d 613.
38. 322 N.W.2d 616.
39. 339 N.W.2d 274 (Minn. 1983).
40. Biaich, 298 Minn. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 614-15.
41. 322 N.W.2d at 618-19.
42. 339 N.W.2d at 278-79.
[Vol. 12
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The Bialick decision involved an established attorney who commit-
ted a number of acts of professional misconduct, including commin-
gling, conversion, and misrepresentation.43 The Bialick court termed
the respondent's conduct "a complete disregard of the professional
standards expected of a practicing lawyer."44
The respondent argued that his mental and physical illnesses and
drug addiction were mitigating circumstances.45 Thus, he claimed
that he was severely addicted to narcotics when he committed these
acts. 46 He also claimed that he was suffering from a personality
disorder.
4 7
The referee refused to consider any intervening circumstances.48
The referee held that the respondent failed to establish that he
should not be disbarred by a preponderance of the evidence.49 The
referee searched for evidence indicating that the respondent was suf-
ficiently rehabilitatedO so that reacting to problems in practice
would not cause him to regress. 5 1
Noting the number and severity of incidents involved,52 the Min-
nesota Supreme Court disbarred the respondent.53 The court stated
43. Bialick, 298 Minn. at 377, 215 N.W.2d at 613. Bialick's acts of misconduct
included wrongfully obtaining funds by using his position as an attorney, inattention
to matters entrusted to him by clients, neglecting to communicate with clients,
fabricating facts in court documents, writing checks against insufficient deposits, and
failing to account for client trust funds. Id. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 615.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 614-15.
46. Brief for Respondent at 19, In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 215 N.W.2d 613
(1974) (copy on file at the William Mitchell Law Review office).
47. Id
48. Id. at 8-9.
49. Bialick, 298 Minn. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 614.
50. The respondent offered no evidence that he was undergoing any treatment
for his alleged disabilities. He was not seeing a chemical dependency counselor or a
psychologist, nor had he joined any support groups. The referee was not satisfied
that the respondent was making an earnest effort to cure his disability. Id.
51. Id. The respondent did not provide the referee with assurance that he would
no longer be a threat to unsuspecting clients. The court stated that allowing him to
continue practicing law could jeopardize the public's confidence in attorneys. See id.
at 379, 215 N.W.2d at 615.
52. Id.
53. Id. A number of other jurisdictions have refused to recognize alcoholism as a
mitigating factor in attorney misconduct cases. The Georgia Supreme Court has held
that alcoholism will not mitigate sanctions imposed upon an attorney who commits
professional misconduct. In re Byars, 245 Ga. 830, 830, 268 S.E.2d 155, 156 (1980).
In Indiana, alcoholism is a separate ethical violation. Excessive use of alcohol, with-
out any showing of mitigating circumstances, violates Discipinary Rule 1-102 (A)(6) of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In re Slenker, 424 N.E.2d 1005, 1006
(1981).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar
1985]
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that the concern for the public's protection was so great that even a
few of the incidents alone would be adequate grounds to disbar
him.54 The court also noted a factor which was later to become one
of the requirements of the disability defense; specifically, the ele-
ment of causation.55 As a result, the court did not find sufficient evi-
dence in the referee's record to sustain the respondent's contention
that any or all of the acts were the product of his mental illness or
drug addiction.56 The court, however, did not specify what would
constitute sufficient evidence57 to successfully prove a disability.58
B. The Framework of the Defense
Eight years after Bialick, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided In
re Johnson.59 Johnson, the second of three milestone disability cases,
established a framework practitioners may use to successfully assert a
mitigating disability.60 The principles laid down in Johnson have been
applied in subsequent disability cases. 6 1
The Johnson decision involved a situation substantially similar to
that of Bialick. The respondent, a sole practitioner, converted a cli-
ent's settlement funds to his own use.6 2 He also failed to communi-
Association (ABA) in August, 1983. Although the new rules replace the old Code of
Professional Responsibility, many states have not followed the ABA and still pattern
their professional conduct rules after the old Model Code. Minnesota is one of the
forerunners in adopting a new code to conform with the ABA Model Rules. See supra
note 4.
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain counterparts to
the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules of the old Model Code.
Instead, they contain only black letter rules of law followed by comments. Many of
the new rules encompass the substance of the old Model Code, but the comparison is
by no means exact. For example, Canon 9 of the old Code has no precise counter-
part in the new Rules, although some of its central themes can be found in Rule 1.9
of the new Model Rules. See LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
(ABA/BNA) § 01:124 (1984).
54. 298 Minn. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 615.
55. Id. at 378-79, 215 N.W.2d at 615.
56. Id.
57. The criteria used in attorney misconduct cases is the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard. It is an intermediate standard, being more than mere prepon-
derance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required in the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 227 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Fred C.
Walker Agency, Inc. v. Lucas, 215 Va. 535, 211 S.E.2d 88 (1975)).
58. Although a disability framework was established in Johnson, the court has re-
mained silent on this evidentiary issue.
59. 322 N.W.2d 616.
60. Id. at 618-19.
61. See, e.g., Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 278-79 (Johnson test applied to psychological
disability).
62. 322 N.W.2d at 616-17. The respondent misappropriated a client's personal
injury claim in the amount of $3,300. Id at 616. Instead of giving his client the
settlement amount and keeping the one-third share for fees, the respondent forged
[Vol. 12
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cate with his client 63 and did not keep adequate trust fund records.64
At the time of his misconduct, the respondent was suffering from
acute alcoholism.65 His contemporaries contacted LCL in March of
1981. At the time of the case, he had not consumed alcoholic bever-
ages and had regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.66
Thereafter, the respondent maintained sobriety and faithfully at-
tended Alcoholics Anonymous and LCL meetings.67 He also contin-
ued to practice law under peer supervision in an ethical and proper
manner.68
The referee found that the respondent's conduct did not result
from any lack of integrity or honesty.69 Rather, the respondent was a
stable individual who suffered temporary mental deterioration due to
excessive alcohol abuse. 70 The respondent's ability to practice law
was not impaired if he abstained from alcohol.T1 In addition, he had
a satisfactory record as an attorney prior to his alcohol-related
problems.72 The referee decided that respondent would revert back
to his high standard of conduct if he remained sober.7T
The referee recommended that the respondent continue to prac-
tice law under certain terms of probation,74 with supervision for a
two-year period.75 The supervisor was instructed to make quarterly
reports on the respondent's conduct to the Lawyers Professional Re-
sponsibility Board.76 If the respondent violated any of the probation
the client's endorsement and used the entire amount to prevent a mortgage foreclo-
sure on his own home. Id at 616-17. During the ensuing three years, the respondent
was contacted by his client regarding the status of the case. The respondent
fabricated a story that the case had not been settled. Id. at 617. When the client filed
a complaint with the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, the respondent used
fees from another settlement to issue a check for $2,200 payable to the client. Id.
63. See id. at 617.
64. Id A subsequent investigation of the respondent's behavior by the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board indicated that he failed to keep adequate trust
fund records. Id. In actuality, the respondent was using his client's trust account to










74. Id. at 618. These terms included continued alcohol abuse treatment and
practicing law with peer supervision. The prohibition would be lifted pending satis-
factory compliance with these terms. Id. at 617-18.
75. Id. at 618.
76. Id The reports were required to state whether the respondent was comply-
ing with the probationary terms. Id
1985l
9
et al.: The Disability efense: How It Serves to Mitigate Charges of Prof
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LIW REVIEW
terms, he would be immediately suspended from practicing law, sub-
ject to a summary disbarment hearing.77
The Board's counsel inJohnson did not advocate disbarment in ar-
guments to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Rather, the counsel
presented two alternatives.78 The first alternative was suspension,
with the right to reapply for active status upon a showing that alco-
holism had caused the respondent's misconduct and that he was on
his way to successfully completing his chemical abuse treatment pro-
gram.79 The second alternative was suspension, with the order be-
ing stayed for two years upon the condition that the respondent
comply with certain criteria.80 The court chose the latter
alternative.81
Before disposing of the Johnson case, the court attempted to clarify
situations in which an attorney, who violates disciplinary rules may
properly claim to be suffering from alcoholism.82 The court under-
took this clarification at the urging of the Board's counsel and the
Board's Director, Michael J. Hoover.8 3 Hoover suggested five crite-
ria to enable the court to determine whether alcoholism merits disci-
plinary mitigations.84 The five criteria are:
1. That the accused attorney is affected by alcoholism.
2. That the alcoholism caused the misconduct.
3. That the accused attorney is recovering from alcoholism and
from any other disorders which caused or contributed to the
misconduct.
4. That the recovery has arrested the misconduct, and the mis-
conduct is not apt to reoccur.
5. That the accused attorney must establish these criteria by




80. Id. These conditions included continued treatment and regular attendance
at LCL meetings. Id. at 617-18.
81. Id. The court did not disbar the respondent. Rather, it stated that disbar-
ment is only necessary as a disciplinary method when the public's protection is at
stake. Id. at 618. In Johnson, however, the public's protection was not threatened,
since the respondent was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation. Disbarment was
not justified. Id Cf supra note 51 (respondent in Bialick showed no signs of rehabili-
tation and was subsequently disbarred).
82. 322 N.W.2d at 618.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Id The guidelines suggest that an attorney should be suspended, or in less
stigmatic terminology, placed on "inactive enrollment" or "disability inactive status"
when he has been judicially declared incompetent or incapacitated due to alcoholism,
drug abuse, or mental illness. ABA GUIDELINES FOR RULES OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT (1979) (cited in HOOVER & HARDEN, infra note 124, at 7). A total of
thirty-two states have not promulgated rules setting forth criteria for suspension of
[Vol. 12
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The court adopted the above criteria due to the inconsistencies in
Minnesota on methods of analyzing an alcoholism defense in profes-
sional misconduct matters.8 6
The Johnson court noted that causation is the critical issue in any
case where alcoholism will be asserted to mitigate misconduct
charges. 87 A respondent must establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that alcoholism caused the misconduct.8 It is not enough to
merely claim that the respondent is an alcoholic and expect charges
to be mitigated. As theJohnson court stated, alcoholism alone is not a
defense to professional misconduct. 89
While shedding more light on the causation issue than Bialick, the
Johnson court failed to illuminate how the practitioner may success-
fully prove causation. The only guideline offered by the court was
that medical evidence should not be the sole evidence proffered in
proving causation.90 The court, however, hesitated to formulate any
specific evidentiary rule. The court stated that past experience has
shown that such evidentiary rule changes are best formulated by a
committee of the court rather than in the court's opinion process. 91
Although Minnesota became the first state to establish criteria to
prove alcoholism as a mitigating disability in misconduct cases,
92 it
alcoholic or mentally ill attorneys. Skoler and Klein, Mental Disability and Lawyer Disci-
pline, 12J. MAR.J. PRAc. & PRoc. 227, 232 (1979) (cited in HOOVER & HARDEN, infra
note 124, at 6-7). Minnesota is the only state to promulgate an objective standard to
determine whether a disability mitigates charges of professional misconduct. Id.
86. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
87. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618.
88. Id at 619; but see In re Walker, 254 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 1977). The Walker court
held that alcoholism as a causation factor in misconduct cases will not "shield the
perpetrator from the consequences of his actions." Id. at 457. The Walker court em-
phasized that it would allow the respondent to continue practicing law not because
he was an admitted alcoholic, but because he was a bona fide recovering alcoholic
who had abstained from consuming alcohol for two and one-half years. Id
89. 322 N.W.2d at 618-19. The Illinois Supreme Court has also taken the posi-
tion that "alcoholism is at most an extenuating circumstance, a mitigating fact, not an
excuse." In re Driscoll, 85 Ill. 2d 312, 316, 423 N.E.2d 873, 874 (1981). Driscoll
involved misappropriation of client funds. Id. at 313, 423 N.E.2d at 873. The court
held that since Driscoll's judgment was impaired by alcoholism, suspension from
practice for six months was appropriate discipline as long as he abstained from alco-
hol for two and one-half years, and reported periodically on his rehabilitation. Id at
317, 423 N.E.2d at 875.
90. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619.
91. Id. The court invited concerned parties to petition the court to conduct a
hearing upon proposed evidentiary rules affecting the formulation of an evidentiary
standard. Id,
92. Thirty-two states have recognized alcoholism as a mitigating factor in attor-
ney misconduct cases. Skoler & Klein, supra note 85, at 232; see, e.g., Tenner v. State
Bar, 28 Cal. 3d 202, 617 P.2d 486, 168 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1980); Florida Bar v. Ullen-
svang, 400 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1981); In re Strickland, 87 NJ. 575, 436 A.2d 1337
(1981); In re Kiepura, 75 A.D.2d 664, 426 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1980).
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was unclear whether the Johnson criteria apply to narcotic and mental
illness disabilities.93 The Johnson court stated that it was adopting
the criteria prospectively to affect any hearing following the deci-
sion,9 4 but it did not state any applicable factual situations.
It is unclear whether Bialick is still good law. First, Bialick was not
expressly overruled by Johnson. Second, Bialick involved drug abuse,
whereasJohnson involved alcoholism. The Johnson court perhaps was
more sympathetic to alcoholics than the Bialick court was to drug
abusers.95 Third, Johnson had less experience as an attorney than
Bialick.96 Minnesota disciplinary law tends to be more lenient to-
ward less experienced attorneys. 97 Finally, Johnson's misconduct
centered around one isolated event.98 By contrast, Bialick's miscon-
duct consisted of a variety of disciplinary rule violations, which
harmed a variety of clients. 99 Perhaps the severity of Bialick's mis-
conduct would have justified disbarment, even if the disability miti-
gation criteria had been present.oo Thus, in light of the Johnson
decision, it remains unclear whether Bialick has any continuing prac-
tical application. 101
C. Judicial Clarification: In re Weyhrich
The Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to clarify the application
of Johnson in Weyhrich, 102 the third of the milestone disability cases.
Weyhrich involved an attorney's professional misconduct extending
over a four-year period. The alleged misconduct included neglect-
93. TheJohnson decision did not expressly overrule Bialick, or In re Streater, 262
Minn. 538, 115 N.W.2d 729 (1962 )(emotional and mental illness).
94. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619.
95. There is some authority which suggests alcoholism treatment is more widely
accepted than drug abuse treatment. Cf Note, supra note 14, at 1662.
96. Johnson had been in practice for five years before his problems surfaced.
Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 616. Bialick had been in practice twelve years. Bialick, 298
Minn. at 377, 215 N.W.2d at 614.
97. See In re Opacek, 257 Minn. 600, 101 N.W.2d 606 (1960) (attorney's lack of
experience cited as mitigating factor).
98. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 617. AlthoughJohnson violated trust account regula-
tions, the only client harmed by his action was the client in the personal injury mat-
ter. See supra note 64.
99. Bialick, 298 Minn. at 378, 215 N.W.2d at 615.
100. Id. at 378-79, 215 N.W.2d at 615. The court stated, "[t]he totality of the
conduct indicates a complete disregard of the professional standards expected of a
practicing attorney. Further, a careful examination of the record does not disclose
sufficient evidence to sustain the respondent's contention that any or all of these acts
were the product of his mental illness or drug addiction." Id
101. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1. Jorgensen suggests, however, that the
harsher Bialick approach is anachronistic in view of today's more sympathetic atti-
tudes toward alcoholism and drug abuse. Idt
102. 339 N.W.2d at 274.
[Vol. 12
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss1/4
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ing legal matters and failing to communicate with clients. 103 The
referee found neglect of at least eight client litigation matters, which
resulted in approximately $400,000 in default judgments.104
The court stated that an attorney is usually disbarred when he in-
flicts great harm upon clients.105 Indeed, the respondent's conduct
appeared more severe than the conduct of other attorneys which had
previously resulted in disbarment.106 The respondent admitted his
103. 1I at 275-78. From 1977 through 1981, the respondent grossly neglected
numerous legal matters entrusted to him. Idt at 276-78. The respondent also failed
to communicate with clients, failed to appear in court, commenced bad-faith litiga-
tion, abandoned his law practice, and failed to cooperate with an investigation by the
Board. Id at 275. Failure to cooperate with a Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board investigation constitutes a separate ground for charges of professional miscon-
duct. See supra note 3.
104. 339 N.W.2d at 278. Included in that amount was a default judgment against
the respondent, which was the result of a malpractice claim against him for neglect-
ing a legal matter. It
105. lId The protection of the public is the ultimate goal of any Lawyers Profes-
sional Responsibility proceeding. ABA SPECIAL COMMrrrEE ON EVALUATION OF Dis-
CIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1970) (commonly known as the Clark report). The
rationale supporting the goal is stated as follows:
[P]ublic protection policy behind lawyer discipline prohibits a total defense
or excuse for conduct driven by mental or emotional instability. However,
such factors should, depending on the seriousness of the offense, be rele-
vant to the choice of sanctions and extent of court supervision of future
conduct.
The states are in substantial accord that to allow a mentally incompe-
tent attorney to practice law would endanger the legal system and the pub-
lic. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and at least 32 states'
disciplinary rules call for the suspension or transfer to inactive status of in-
competent attorneys prior to commission of misconduct. These rules seem
so natural and essential that the laws' previous lack of concern for mental
illness among attorneys is surprising and, in some ways, even shocking ...
Most jurisdictions now accept current mental disability, at least where
classical psychosis or mental illness is involved, as a bar or "defense" to
disciplinary proceedings, and many seem increasingly willing to seek inac-
tive enrollment or medical suspension as a proper discipline for an attorney
whose serious mental difficulties have led or contributed to actionable
misconduct.
Skoler & Klein, supra note 85, at 249-50.
Treating disabilities as mitigating factors in disciplinary proceedings is sound
public policy. The courts can prevent mentally incompetent lawyers from harming
unsuspecting clients, yet allow those mentally ill or alcoholic attorneys who have re-
habilitated themselves to pursue their chosen livelihood and make a contribution to
society once again. Furthermore, treating disability as an aggravating factor, or as a
separate ground for discipline, does not recognize the involuntariness of true disabil-
ities. Such a policy is anachronistic. See supra note 101.
106. See Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279. In Streater, the Minnesota Supreme Court
disbarred the respondent for neglecting probate matters. Although the respondent
allegedly suffered from emotional and mental illnesses which made it impossible for
him to conduct his law practice, the court held:
[W]here an attorney's misconduct in violation of professional ethics justified
disbarment, imposition of the penalty should not be deterred by a plea of a
mental condition disqualifying the attorney from the practice of law, nor
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misconduct, 107 but argued that his conduct was caused by a disabil-
ity. He alleged that severe depression and mental illness had caused
his difficulties. 1O8 The respondent urged the court not to disbar him,
but rather, to extend the Johnson criteria to disabilities including
mental illness, and to indefinitely suspend him from the practice of
law. 109
The Minnesota Supreme Court complied only with the respon-
dent's first request. The court held that in cases where an attorney
raises psychological disability as a factor mitigating his misconduct,
he must show that he has a severe psychological problem, that the
psychological problem caused the misconduct, and that he is pro-
gressing toward recovery as a result of treatment. In addition, the
court held that the attorney must prove that his recovery has arrested
the misconduct and that the misconduct is not likely to reoccur." 0
As inJohnson, the court held that the respondent must establish that
he meets these requirements by clear and convincing evidence.l'
The court, however, found no causal relationship between the re-
spondent's alleged psychological problems and his misconduct.112
Consequently, the respondent was disbarred.l"3
Although the court disbarred the attorney in Weyhrich, the decision
expands the Johnson criteria to include mental disabilities 14 and
should the attorney be permitted to resign from the legal profession in lieu
of disbarment.
Streater, 262 Minn. at 543-44, 115 N.W.2d at 733; see also In re Wohlfeld, 12 A.D.2d
82, 208 N.Y.S.2d 326, appeal denied, 13 A.D.2d 456, 212 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1960)
(proper regard for the protection of the public required disbarment to prevent future
misconduct).
107. Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 278. The respondent candidly admitted his miscon-
duct in argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court. hI He also admitted that he
was not presently competent to practice law, and asked the court to continue his
suspension indefinitely. Id,
108. 1i The respondent stated that he suffered from alcoholism prior to 1975.
Although he had not consumed alcoholic beverages since that time, his sobriety
caused severe depression and mental illness, L He also argued that these disabili-
ties caused him to neglect legal matters from 1977 to 1981. See id
109. See id. at 278. The respondent urged the court to impose the sanction of
indefinite suspension as the court had done in other cases. Id See, e.g., In re Peters,
332 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1983); In re O'Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863 (Minn. 1983); In re Leali,
320 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1982); In re Iverson, 305 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1981).
110. 339 N.W.2d at 279. The criteria set forth in Weyhrich parallel the criteria
established in Johnson. The only difference is that the term "psychological problem"
is substituted for "alcoholism." Cf Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618.
111. See Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279.
112. Id. The respondent failed to demonsrate by clear and convincing evidence
that he was affected by psychological disorders at the time of his misconduct. He
failed to show any causal relationship between any alleged psychological problems
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sheds more light on the causation and clear and convincing evidence
requirements.15 The court's opinion clearly states that in cases
where a respondent attorney raises psychological disability as a miti-
gating factor, the respondent may use the modified Johnson crite-
ria.116 Thus, psychological disabilities are now recognized in
Minnesota as mitigating factors, but it is the respondent's burden to
affirmatively prove the defense.
The court's opinion in Weyhrich also illustrates how difficult it is to
prove the causation requirement. While the respondent in Weyhrich
had certain psychological problems, he could not prove a causal rela-
tionship between his alleged disability and the misconduct. He failed
to show how his severe depression and mental illness caused him to
neglect legal matters. 1 7 Because indefinite suspension is usually im-
posed in either isolated or less severe misconduct cases, the court's
only alternative was to disbar the respondent.118
Another factor contributing to disbarment was that the attorney in
Weyhrich failed to assure the court by clear and convincing evidence
that future misconduct would not reoccur. 19 The attorney failed to
prove that treatment had arrested his psychological disorders120 and
that he was recovering.121 The only evidence offered was that the
respondent was seeing a psychologist.122 This evidence was insuffi-
cient to assure the court that the public interest would be adequately
protected and that there would be an effective deterrent against fu-
ture misconduct.123
The Weyhrich decision provides insight into the causation and the
clear and convincing evidence requirements. Some critics, however,
still question whether the Minnesota Supreme Court is correct in es-
115. See id. at 278-79.
116. Id. at 279.
117. Id.
118. See id. But cf. In re LaRocque, 295 N.W.2d 97 (Minn. 1980). The LaRocque
court approved the stipulation wherein the respondent admitted to the charges
against him, and agreed to an indefinite suspension with right to apply for reinstate-
ment after one year upon proof that he was psychologically fit to practice and that he
met all continuing legal education requirements. Id. at 98.




123. Id. The Weyhrich court noted that the purpose of an attorney disciplinary pro-
ceeding is to protect the public and the court and to serve as a deterrent against
future misconduct. Id. (citing In re Serstock, 316 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn. 1982)); In
re Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960). In Weyhrich, the re-
spondent's continuing pattern of misconduct underscored the ongoing need to pro-
tect the public and warranted disbarment. 339 N.W.2d at 279. See also In re Braggans,
280 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1979) (protecting the public is the foremost responsibility of
the attorney disciplinary process).
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tablishing this defense. Criticism of the defense usually centers on
the criteria used to establish the defense, and whether Minnesota
should have adopted the Johnson criteria.
III. THE DISABILrrY DEFENSE CRITERIA: AN EXAMINATION
The five disability defense criteria have been praised by some and
criticized by others.124 Minnesota has been recognized and com-
mended for adopting a progressive approach for dealing with alco-
holic and mentally ill attorneys. 125 The criteria have captured the
new outlook toward disabilities and have spurred an innovative ap-
proach to discipline.126
A. Approval of the Disability Defense
The disability defense criteria are practical.' 2 7 On one hand, re-
spondents know what must be proved in order to successfully estab-
lish a mitigating circumstance.' 28 On the other hand, Johnson and
Weyhrich clearly hold that alcoholism and mental illness are not com-
plete defenses,129 but rather, that they are only mitigating circum-
stances.' 30  Thus, while the criteria do not provide absolute
vindication, they do allow respondents to successfully assert a
disability. 131
The disability criteria also provide an outlook toward chemical
abuse or mental illness which is consistent with the main goal of the
attorney disciplinary process: protection of the public.132 First, suc-
cessful respondents must prove that there is a causal connection be-
124. See generally M. HOOVER & R. HARDEN, DISABILrrY DEFENSE AND MITIGATION,
ABA COMMrITEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1984) (copy on file at the Wil-
liam Mitchell Law Review office) [hereinafter cited as HOOVER & HARDIN]. This arti-
cle was presented to the National Organization of Bar Counsel at the August 2, 1984
convention in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Hoover is the former director of the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board. Mr. Harden is a former staff attorney for the Law-
yers Professional Responsibility Board.
125. See id.
126. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
127. Id The effect of providing the defense is to enable respondents to better
plan their misconduct defense cases. By giving respondents a certain framework with
which to work, respondents know which arguments are most effective. The Board's
counsel also benefit because they can better anticipate respondents' arguments. Id
128. Id.
129. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618; see Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279.
130. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618; Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279.
131. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
132. HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 18-19. A state supreme court normally
has inherent power to regulate its state bar. Cf Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 792 (1975). Therefore, courts should discipline attorneys who endanger
the public. See Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10 (the goal of the attorney disciplinary process in
Minnesota is to protect the public).
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tween the disability and the misconduct.l33 It is insufficient for the
respondent to merely show he is an alcoholic.134 The respondent
must also prove an additional element indicating that the alleged dis-
ability caused the misconduct.lS5 This criterion appropriately illus-
trates that the court does not allow those who breach the public's
confidence and trust in attorneys to easily mitigate misconduct
charges. 136
Second, the respondent must undergo treatment and be on his
way toward a successful recovery. I3 7 This requirement ensures that
the respondent is serious about changing his behavior and is working
to rehabilitate himself138 Furthermore, the criteria ensure that the
respondent is less likely to be a threat to the public, when readmitted
to the bar.13 9
Finally, the disability criteria must be proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 140 Because the disciplinary proceeding is neither crim-
inal nor civil, it is termed sui generis141 and requires the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard.14 2 This standard is consistent
throughout attorney and judicial misconduct cases.1 4 3 It is logical,
therefore, to require respondents to prove the disability criteria by
clear and convincing evidence.
B. Criticism of the Disability Defense
Criticism of the criteria centers upon the type of evidence needed
to prove that the disability caused the misconduct. The Johnson and
Weyhrich courts did not specify what type of evidence is sufficient to
prove causation. The only explicit evidentiary discussion is found in
Johnson, where the court stated that medical evidence should not be
the sole evidence presented. 144 Weyhrich implicitly indicated that evi-
133. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618. The strict causation requirement illustrates that
the court will not allow attorneys, who breach the public's confidence and trust, to
easily mitigate misconduct charges. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
134. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618.
135. Id.; see also HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 21. The causation require-
ment is purposely drafted narrowly in order to limit the number of respondents
claiming alcoholism as a mitigating factor. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
136. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
137. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618; Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279.
138. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
139. Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279. A sincere rehabilitation effort is the best way to
prove to the Minnesota Supreme Court that the respondent meets the recovery crite-
ria. By convincing the court that the respondent is no longer a threat to the public,
the court's goal of public protection is served.
140. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619; Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279.
141. See In re Rerat, 224 Minn. 124, 127, 28 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1947).
142. See Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619; HoOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 21.
143. See In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785, 805 (Minn. 1978).
144. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619. The Johnson court also opined that it is not suffi-
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dence of treatment alone is not sufficient.145 Evidence presented
must show that the disability caused the misconduct and that treat-
ment has arrested the disability.146 Therefore, Johnson and Weyhrich
provide no indication of what constitutes clear and convincing causal
evidence. 147
C. Evidence and the Standard of Proof
Minnesota disciplinary case law indicates different types of suffi-
cient evidence. Expert medical testimonyl48 and medical evi-
dence149 have been successfully utilized to establish clear and
convicing proof. Expert testimony from medical personnel may in-
clude evidence from physicians and chemical abuse counselors.150
Medical expert testimony was addressed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court prior to the Johnson decision in Okerman.15 1 The
Okerman court held that expert testimony was required to distinguish
acute alcoholism from ordinary alcoholism.152 The court reasoned
that if it is to recognize alcoholism as a mitigating factor, an expert
must show that the respondent's alcoholism is acute at the time the
alleged misconduct occurred.153 A simple showing that the respon-
dent is chemically dependent at the time of the misconduct is not
sufficient to mitigate discipline.154
Medical evidence derives from a variety of sources. Medical treat-
cient for the accused lawyer to testify that alcoholism was the cause of his or her
misconduct. Id. at 618-19. Presumably, the court is looking for more authoritative
evidence or other corroborating testimony other than the respondent's own
testimony.
145. Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279. The Weyhrich court stated that the only evi-
dence of treatment offered by the respondent was that he was seeing a psychologist.
The court suggested that mere evidence of treatment is not enough. lId The respon-
dent must offer evidence showing he is recovering. Id.
146. Id.
147. HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 21, 22-23.
148. Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279; In re Okerman, 310 N.W.2d 568 (Minn. 1981).
The testimony offered by the respondent's own expert, however, was detrimental to
his appeal. See Okerman, 310 N.W.2d at 571.
149. See Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 617, 619.
150. See Okerman, 310 N.W.2d at 570-71.
151. See id.
152. See id. Ordinary alcoholism is not enough to mitigate charges of misconduct.
Rather, alcoholism must be "acute" in order for the court to mitigate disciplinary
charges. Id. at 571; see In re Numberger, 272 N.W.2d 914 (Minn. 1978).
153. See Okerman, 310 N.W.2d at 571. Since the respondent's own expert placed
him at the beginning stages of alcoholism during the period of alleged misconduct,
the court did not mitigate the discipline imposed. Id The Okerman court believed
that the respondent's alcoholism was not the cause of his misconduct, but rather, an
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ment files may be introduced as evidence.155 However, medical evi-
dence must meet the clear and convincing evidence standard.156
Additionally, In re Stearns157 alludes to the requirement that any med-
ical evidence presented must be competent. The Stearns court did
not, however, explain exactly what constitutes competent
evidence. 158
While theJohnson court indicated that medical evidence should not
be the sole evidence utilized,'59 there is authority which suggests
that medical evidence is required in all cases, but it should not be the
sole evidence presented.160 Regardless of the Johnson court's true
intent, medical evidence, especially if it relates to the causation crite-
ria, must be offered.161 The Minnesota Supreme Court may be per-
suaded by objective medical findings that an alleged disability caused
misconduct.162 Thus, medical evidence should be included in any
disciplinary case alleging a disability.
D. Two Diferent Results
In addition to criticism regarding the causation criterion, there is
also some concern over whether the Minnesota Supreme Court
should have established the disability defense at all. 163 Case law sug-
gests that in spite of the popular current view towards alcoholism
and mental illness,164 the attorney disciplinary process must adhere
155. See HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 22-23. Furthermore, when an at-
torney asserts a disability defense as a mitigating factor, he waives the doctor-patient
privilege. MINNESOTA RuLEs ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSILITY Rule 28(e).
156. HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 20.
157. 309 Minn. 598, 243 N.W.2d 312 (1976). The Stearns court indicated that as a
condition to the respondent's reinstatement to the bar, he must show that "there is a
substantial likelihood, supported by competent medical evidence, that his alcoholism is
and will remain arrested." Id (emphasis supplied). See also HOOVER & HARDEN, supra
note 124, at 22-23.
158. See Stearns, 309 Minn. at 548, 243 N.W.2d at 312.
159. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619.
160. See HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 21. "The [Johnson] court's state-
ment might be read as implying that medical evidence or its equivalent would nor-
mally be required regarding alcoholism, and that other evidence normally would be
considered." Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. Compare Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619 (medical testimony that Johnson's
disability caused misconduct warrants mitigation) with Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279
(lack of medical testimony warrants no mitigation).
163. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
164. Id The disability criteria reflect the view that alcoholism and mental illness
are no longer fault-based offenses. Rather, those disabilities are viewed as diseases.
As with any disease, punishment is not appropriate. Treatment and rehabilitation are
the key elements to correcting the behavior of a disabled attorney. Id.
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to its basic goal: public protection.165 Depending on various cir-
cumstances, some courts are hesitant to recognize a mitigating disa-
bility. Thus, in other jurisdictions, the result is often different than
in Johnson and Weyhrich.
A different result was reached in In re Slenker. 166 In S/enker, the
Indiana Supreme Court held that converting estate funds, drafting
checks which were supported by insufficient funds, and extreme alco-
hol abuse by an attorney warranted disbarment.167 Although the
court did not expand on the point, it did note that during the course
of the hearings, neither the respondent nor his counsel appeared.168
Thus, the record was silent as to any causation between the respon-
dent's alcoholism and his misconduct.169
The court, however, elaborated on the respondent's use of alco-
hol. The court stated that alcoholism adversely reflected upon the
respondent's fitness to practice law. 170 The respondent's alcohol-
ism, coupled with the fact that his financial condition had deterio-
rated to a point where he resorted to cashing bad checks and
converting his clients' funds, convinced the court that the respon-
dent had abandoned the ethical standards expected of all Indiana
attorneys. 1 7
1
A result similar to Slenker was reached in Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion v. Burka. 172 In Burka, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
the respondent's conversion of a client's estate funds warranted dis-
barment.17 3 However, Burka is distinguishable from Slenker in that
the respondent not only actively defended his case,1 74 but he also
attempted to mitigate the charges against him by showing that his
psychiatrist had diagnosed his condition as anxiety neurosis with as-
165. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Burka, 292 Md. 221, 226, 438 A.2d 541,
547 (1981) quoting Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677 (1973).
166. 424 N.E.2d 1005 (Ind. 1981) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 1006.
168. Id.; cf. MINNESOTA RuLEs ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 25
(respondents have a duty to cooperate with Lawyers Board investigations and
proceedings).
169. Slenker, 424 N.E.2d at 1006. The court seemed to be looking for some type of
mitigating circumstance if it can be utilized in a manner akin to the Minnesota causa-
tion requirement. However, the respondent's failure to defend against disciplinary
charges provides the court with no opportunity to determine causation. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 292 Md. 221, 438 A.2d 514.
173. Id. at 227, 438 A.2d at 518. The respondent's misconduct consisted of nu-
merous acts of commingling and conversion of one client's estate fund. Also, the
respondent failed to keep adequate account records and obey court accounting or-
ders. Id at 226-27, 438 A.2d at 517-18.
174. The respondent was initially represented pro se, but later was represented by
counsel. Id. at 222-23, 438 A.2d at 515.
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sociated depression.175 In discussing the factors behind the misap-
propriations, the respondent's psychiatrist opined that the
respondent's decision to disconnect his aged father's life support
system caused severe guilt. As a result, the respondent committed
the misappropriations in a desire to punish himself.176
The court focused on the sufficiency of the respondent's alleged
psychological problems in order to determine whether his conduct
constituted a "compelling extenuating circumstance" that would
merit mitigation.1 77 First, the court noted that the Board of Profes-
sional Responsibility was unconvinced by the psychiatrist's opin-
ion.178 There were inconsistencies between the psychiatrist's report
and the respondent's actual conduct.179 Second, the court noted
that the respondent had waited four years from the time of his mis-
conduct before he sought professional help.S0 During this period,
the respondent was involved in complex litigation and conducted his
law practice.18, His only instance of misconduct was the commin-
gling of estate funds.182 The respondent did not mishandle any
other client affairs, and the evidence did not convince the court that
the respondent was forced by his mental condition to commit the
misconduct. Instead, the court held that the respondent's alleged
psychological disability only had a selective influence.183
The Slenker and Burka decisions illustrate the reasons why some
states will not mitigate charges of misconduct when certain disabili-
ties are present. These decisions illustrate that while certain disabili-
ties may be present, mitigation is not automatic. The courts'
recognition that mitigating circumstances can occur makes the attor-
ney disciplinary process consistent with the popular, decriminalized
approach toward alcoholism and mental illness, while achieving the
goal of public protection.
175. Id. at 223, 438 A.2d at 515.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 226, 438 A.2d at 517. The reason for the strict principle is twofold: (1)
to ensure public confidence in attorneys and (2) to protect the public from attorney
misconduct. Id.
178. Id. at 223, 438 A.2d at 516.
179. Id. The inconsistencies included the psychiatrist's contention that the re-
spondent was incapable of taking care of his own affairs, but capable of taking care of
the affairs of others. Also, the respondent supposedly was not seeking personal gain,
yet financial information disclosed that respondent converted funds to finance an
automobile and home, as well as to pay country club dues, college tuition, and other
miscellaneous expenses. In addition, the psychiatrist's examination took place four
years after the misconduct, and provided no evidence that the respondent's mental
condition affected his personal or clients' affairs. Id.
180. Id. at 226, 438 A.2d at 517.
181. Id. at 226-27, 438 A.2d at 517.
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E. A Final Concern: Manipulation of the Criteria
A final concern regarding Minnesota's disability defense is the
temptation for respondents to mold their cases to fit the criteria.
The disciplinary process could become bogged down if lawyers are
consistently allowed to assert this type of defense.184 Respondents
may choose to seek mitigation by asserting the defense at the
supreme court proceedings at the expense of an expeditious resolu-
tion by stipulation.185 Thus, the defense could increase the time and
costs involved in disciplinary cases.1 86
Supporters of the defense answer this criticism by pointing out
that protracted litigation costs cut both ways.' 87 If a respondent
seeks to assert the defense, then he is also subject to increases in
time and costs.' 8 8 In addition, the respondent may assert the de-
fense in the hopes of mitigating charges, but he must also meet the
established criteria in order to actually receive mitigation.189 The
strict criteria ensure that only a recognized disability will mitigate
misconduct, and that only those who are making progress toward
recovery will receive the benefit of mitigation.190
CONCLUSION
Minnesota is at the forefront among states recognizing mitigating
circumstances in misconduct matters. By enacting specific criteria,
Minnesota's disciplinary law reflects the public's philosophy toward
chemical abuse and psychological disorders.191
Proponents of the disability criteria state that the defense is fair to
both the respondent and the public. The defense allows respon-
dents to mitigate misconduct charges in certain circumstances. It af-
fords the public protection by requiring strict causation,
rehabilitation, and evidentiary criteria.
184. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1. Respondents who would otherwise not
have a defense to charges of professional misconduct may cite the disability defense
to protract litigation and avoid discipline. Id For example, an attorney planning to
retire in two to three years may attempt to use the defense and protract the discipli-
nary procedure for that time period. Then the attorney believes he may retire, resign
from the bar, and thereby avoid the stigma of a public disciplinary proceeding at the
supreme court level. Id. An attorney may not, however, resign to avoid charges of
misconduct. See In re Peck, 302 N.W.2d 356, 360 (Minn. 1981).
185. Jorgensen Interview, supra note 1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. Time and litigation costs are key factors which encourage respondents to
settle disciplinary proceedings quickly. Respondents often stipulate to misconduct
charges in order to avoid the emotional strain of the disciplinary process. Id
189. HOOVER & HARDEN, supra note 124, at 7-8.
190. Id.
191. Id at 6-8.
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Opponents of the criteria cite case law from jurisdictions rejecting
disability mitigation. These cases hold that misconduct involving
dishonesty shall not be compromised. The other jurisdictions have
held that the public can only be protected by disbarring attorneys
who commit misconduct which has tarnished the public's faith in
attorneys.
Criticism of the defense centers on the type of evidence needed to
successfully assert a disability. Critics argue that it enables respon-
dents to protract disciplinary litigation. Supporters answer this claim
by asserting that litigation costs to the respondent and the strictness
of the defense criteria ensure that only those who have a strong like-
lihood of receiving mitigation will assert the defense.
The disability defense is sound disciplinary jurisprudence. It has
been expanded from alcoholism to mental illnesses, and there are
indications that it will be applied to other related areas in the near
future.192 Thus, the defense serves the Minnesota Supreme Court's
goal of public protection while recognizing disabling factors among
members of the bar.
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